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Garver and Noguera: For Safety’s Sake

Introduction
The rise of zero-tolerance policies in many states and school districts has
had the effect of stiffening the penalties mandated for students who violate
school rules and, in some cases, of imposing criminal penalties on
offenses that were previously treated as school disciplinary matters.1,2
Additionally, the advent of zero-tolerance policies has coincided with many
schools and districts adopting strict security measures, including the
installation of metal detectors and surveillance cameras and the
deployment of armed security personnel, all for the purpose of enhancing
security.3-5
Critics of zero-tolerance policies have pointed out that by narrowly
focusing on security many schools have ignored some of the services and
school conditions that are essential to academic achievement, student
well-being, and school safety.1-3,5,6 For example, in many districts, as
funding for security measures has increased, funding for guidance
counselors, social workers, and school psychologists has decreased.3,4 In
many cases, school security efforts have been launched in isolation of
broader measures that have been shown to have a positive impact on the
academic performance of students and the overall effectiveness of
schools.
In this paper, we utilize the case of Seacrest High School, a large
urban school that experienced violent conflicts between Asian and black
students during the 2009-2010 academic year. We use the case to
demonstrate how a preoccupation with school safety led to other
dimensions of school success being ignored. Under the glare of
considerable media scrutiny as a result of the incident and a subsequent
court order that required the school district to take actions to ensure the
safety of students, the district adopted a singular focus on safety and
security that resulted in the neglect of academic engagement and school
culture. As we show through our analysis of the case, the narrow focus on
security undermined the effectiveness of the costly measures that were
adopted and prevented educators from taking actions to address the
overall quality of the educational environment.
We use this case study analysis to make the point that any attempt
to narrow the measure of school success to a singular outcome (in this
case safety) will result in a fragmented approach to school improvement
and lead to other important dimensions of education (e.g., content
knowledge, critical thinking skills, social-emotional support for students,
moral reasoning, civic engagement, and creating equity among students
of different races/classes) being ignored. The data from this case will also
reveal what the constituents of Seacrest felt was neglected as a result of

Published by DigitalCommons@TMC, 2012

1

Journal of Applied Research on Children: Informing Policy for Children at Risk, Vol. 3 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 5

the school’s focus on security. The central question we explore is: What
were the educational and social consequences of an expanded and
intensified regime of policies aimed at improving school safety?
Background
Seacrest High School is located in a large city in the United States.
Although overseen by one administrative team, the school is divided into
academies: a 9th grade academy, three themed 10th through 12th grade
academies, and a program geared toward recent immigrants, most of
whom are English language learners (ELLs). Each academy is located
within a section of the building to allow for some degree of programmatic
autonomy and separation, although there are no official markers or
barriers between the academies. All of the academies share the
gymnasium, auditorium, library, and cafeteria, as well as Seacrest’s
support staff of counselors, after-school program providers, and security
officers.
According to school data reports, the student body of Seacrest High
School is quite diverse. Of the total school population, 51% self-identify as
black or African American, 28% self-identify as Asian (this includes
students from several different countries within Asia), 10% identify as
Hispanic/Latino, and the remainder come from a variety of backgrounds
and nationalities. There are more than 12 languages represented among
the student body, and only 47.7% of the student body’s first home
language is English. After English, Chinese is the most widely spoken
home language, followed by Vietnamese, Spanish, Khmer, and Nepali.
Only 9% of the ELL students are black, and most of these students are
recent African immigrants. Seventy-three percent of the ELL students selfidentify as Asian. Throughout this paper, when we refer to ELL and black
students, we largely mean Asian ELL students and non-ELL, US-born
black students respectively, since these are the two largest groups in the
school.
Because of the large number of immigrant and ELL students,
Seacrest High School offers a variety of services and programs to meet
the language and social needs of this student population. In keeping with
the academy structure of the school, these services and the entire
academic program for ELL students have been housed on one floor of the
school. In practical terms, this means that most of the Asian students in
the school are physically separated from the black students. While the
students do share common spaces within the school—the cafeteria, gym,
auditorium, etc.—they are isolated from each other during most of their
time at Seacrest.
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The Incident
Although Seacrest High School had been classified since 2007 as
“persistently dangerous” under No Child Left Behind (NCLB)i, a conflict
erupted between Asian and black students at the end of 2009 that brought
heightened attention to the school’s level of safety. Though accounts of
the incident vary, an independent investigation found that there were
actually a series of incidents on and outside school grounds over 2 days.
On the first day, small groups of mostly Vietnamese and black students
fought during and after school. The next day, the conflict escalated with
several black students attacking about thirty Asian students in the
hallways of Seacrest. Several Asian students were again targeted as they
walked home. Many of the Asian students who were attacked on the
second day had not been involved in the initial conflict. Some Asian
students were injured quite severely during these attacks and required
medical attention. According to police reports, the black students involved
were primarily 9th and 10th graders, and most of the Asian students who
were targeted had been in the US for less than one year. Despite these
patterns, some victims and witnesses reported that there were white and
Cambodian students among the assailants. Nonetheless, the media
portrayed the incident as an interracial conflict between Asian and black
students.
Following the incident, the students identified as assailants were
removed from the school; however, many Asian students reported they
still felt unsafe at Seacrest and began an official boycott of the school with
the support of parents and community groups. The principal and
superintendent attempted to downplay the significance of the incident and
reported to the media that the school was safe. Finally, after 3 weeks of
the boycott by dozens of Asian students, the superintendent reported that
the principal would be replaced and several security measures would be
enacted to ensure that there would be no recurrence of violence.
Subsequently, the school took measures to increase surveillance
and policing. Additional security cameras were added to the hallways and
stairwells. The number of security officers was increased from 2 to 15, and
some officers were transferred if their response on the days of the attacks
was perceived as inadequate or inappropriate. Efforts were made to

i

Although the federal NCLB legislation requires states to designate schools as
“persistently dangerous,” it is up to each state to develop a definition of this label and to
give it to schools as it sees necessary. NCLB requires that parents at a “persistently
dangerous” school are informed that they can enroll their children at a different school.
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clearly inform the student body about procedures for reporting incidents
and the consequences of bullying and fighting.
In response to requests by community groups, the incident was
investigated by the State Board of Human Relations and the US
Department of Justice. These investigations resulted in the enactment of a
consent decree between the school district, the state, and the US
Department of Justice. The consent decree required the district to appoint
an outside monitor who would be responsible for overseeing the variety of
measures that would be taken to ensure student safety.
Literature Review
Interracial Conflict
Research on inter-group student conflict can be traced back to the influx of
Eastern and Southern European immigrants at the beginning of the 20th
century. Education scholars felt that inter-ethnic conflict and competition
between immigrant groups distinguished by linguistic, religious, and/or
cultural differences posed a threat to social cohesion at the local and
national levels. Schools were regarded as the primary institution charged
with socializing new immigrants and forging a common culture through
assimilation. Over time, scholars believed that assimilation would lead to a
reduction in conflict between ethnic groups.7
Concerns with intergroup student conflict emerged again with the
advent of desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s, as black students began
enrolling in white-majority schools. Scholars, such as sociologist Gordon
W. Allport,8 developed the contact hypothesis to explain the patterns of
interracial conflict within schools and communities. According to this
theory, following an initial period of intense conflict, there would be a
gradual reduction of tension as groups improved their ability to
communicate. For Allport, this was most likely to occur under conditions of
equal status, as groups pursued common goals and as opportunities to
develop informal relationships increased through everyday interactions
and other forms of cooperation.8 Interracial conflict in schools was
understood as stemming from a lack of exposure, awareness, and
understanding.9 In response, researchers and practitioners developed
multicultural curricula, facilitated interracial dialogue, and implemented
programs to bring youth together within the structure of planned activities.9
Although later research nuanced the contact hypothesis by delineating the
particular demographic or institutional factors that explain why intergroup
interaction is more or less successful in different cases,10 the contact
hypothesis is still a powerful and pervasive paradigm employed in
responses to interracial conflict.
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Since the 1980s, research concerned with interracial conflict in
schools has waned. This may be due in part to the decrease in efforts to
promote racial integration since the late 1970s.11 It may also be because
integration and interracial conflict have been largely explored along the
black-white binary, and white students have become increasingly isolated
in majority-white schools. This focus has left the relationships between
communities of color within schools devoid of white students largely
underexplored. In one of the few studies that makes a particular effort to
broaden the study of interracial conflict to minority groups other than
blacks, Kiang and Kaplan12 illuminate the voices of Vietnamese students
in the context of a black-white interracial conflict in a Boston high school.
They demonstrate that while the Vietnamese students were not directly
involved in the conflict at their school, its effects greatly influenced the
Vietnamese students’ schooling experiences. Additional research that
explores the roots of interracial/ethnic conflict and effective interventions
for minority-minority conflict is needed, especially as schools with few
white students continue to become more numerous, increasingly isolated,
and internally diverse.
Although research on interracial conflict at school is limited,
education literature has often drawn distinctions between immigrant and
black American students that may serve as a useful foundation for
exploring minority-minority conflict. Most notably, anthropologist John
Ogbu13 distinguished between voluntary immigrants, such as Chinese and
Indian immigrants, and non-voluntary immigrants, such as American
Indians, Puerto Ricans, and blacks, in the United States. Ogbu posited
that non-voluntary immigrants perform worse in public US schools and are
more likely to exhibit oppositional behavior because they equate schooling
with a form of cultural oppression. In contrast, he suggested that voluntary
immigrants are more likely to be motivated to embrace schooling and to
exhibit a high tolerance for discrimination because they regard
assimilation as the necessary requirement for social mobility. Unfamiliar
with the dominant US culture, they are often oblivious to manifestations of
racism, xenophobia, and classism, or they excuse them as matters of
cultural difference. Although this historical-cultural approach to explaining
the academic differences between immigrant and black students fails to
account for variation within groups, it is somewhat helpful for drawing
attention to the often disparate academic experiences of black and
immigrant students in school settings.
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Zero-Tolerance Policies and Responses to Interracial Conflict
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, schools began to adopt and expand the
“zero-tolerance” disciplinary and policing practices that were becoming
common in the adult criminal justice system.1,3-5,14,15 This shift not only
mirrored paradigm changes in governance and the criminal justice
system,16,17 but it also reflected a trend toward narrowing the responsibility
of teachers to curricular concerns, leaving behavior and discipline to outof-classroom specialists and security agents.1,2 In 1994, President Clinton
signed into law the Gun-Free Schools Act, which mandated a 1-year
suspension for any student who brought a gun to school. This policy
served as the basis for a broader regime of zero-tolerance policies in
which a range of subjective and objective disciplinary infractions were to
be addressed by harsh and exclusionary sanctions.4,5 These changes
were accelerated by highly publicized violent school incidents, such as the
Columbine shootings.4 The media created the impression that schools
were in a state of crisis and suffering from an unprecedented epidemic of
violence—an image that incited fear and lent support to the expansion of
zero-tolerance policies.18,19
Zero-tolerance policies are characterized by the frequent use of
exclusionary sanctions, such as suspension and expulsion, as well as a
discipline code that provides administrators and teachers little discretion in
individualizing responses to particular incidents.1,3,15,20,21 Under a regime
of zero tolerance, even low-level infractions are often met with harsh
punishment. Research shows that such policies often have the effect of
punishing those students who are most in need of academic or mental
health supports because it is typically the most disadvantaged students
who engage in rule-breaking behavior or are pushed out by schools.6,14
Kafka1 and Devine2 explain the historical rise of zero-tolerance
discipline policies in the context of a growing separation of the school’s
roles as educator and as moral advisor. With zero-tolerance policies, the
number of police in schools has grown, and the utilization of law
enforcement officials to ensure school safety has become increasingly
common. Policing in schools has become commonplace, particularly in
urban schools, where metal detectors and surveillance cameras have
become ubiquitous. In fact, the utilization of punitive approaches to school
security has become so pervasive and widely accepted that other
paradigms for creating a safe environment are rarely considered.2,5
Even though the school shootings that helped legitimize zero
tolerance took place in white suburban communities, the policies’ most
punitive effects have been in urban, minority, and low-income schools
such as Seacrest.18 While zero tolerance is ostensibly a “colorblind”
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policy,22 research suggests that it has often been implemented in a
manner that results in racial disparities.6 In practice, zero tolerance has
been used as a mechanism to disproportionately punish the least
successful students, who in many cases have the least motivation to obey
school rules. In this way, zero-tolerance policies have been found to
perpetuate a form of racial discrimination, with minority students bearing
the brunt of increasingly higher stakes and more severe consequences.6,23
Accordingly, schools with a lower percentage of white students have been
found to have higher suspension rates.24,25 Even though zero-tolerance
policies and practices disproportionately affect students of color, they have
become pervasive characteristics of a broad cross-section of American
schools.3
With the rise of zero-tolerance policies, interracial conflict in schools
has been redefined as the result of criminal-like behavior of individual
students. Within the climate created by zero-tolerance policies, the
understanding of interracial conflict as rooted in cultural misunderstanding
and structures that promote racial segregation has been overshadowed by
a framework that casts offending students as deviant and criminal.
Increasingly, students who engage in intergroup conflict are no longer
seen as being in need of sensitivity training or more exposure but instead
are more likely to be treated as criminals who need to be punished. This
transition from one paradigm to the other reflects the move away from a
structural critique of segregation. In the forthcoming analysis of the case, it
will become clear that a punitive paradigm that treats individual students
directly involved in interracial conflict as criminal offenders came at the
expense of a structural critique that treats the roots of conflict as a
byproduct of the segregation of student groups.ii
School Climate and Responses to Student Conflict
Several studies have documented the negative impact of zero-tolerance
policies on school climate.3,5 Strict and inflexible regulations undermine
the close student-teacher relationships that keep schools safe.2,5 Strong,
positive relationships between adults and students have been found to
create safety by building a climate of trust, respect, responsibility, and
academic engagement26-29 and by deterring misbehavior.30
Several studies have shown that students who attend schools with
a positive school culture have higher levels of academic engagement. In
contrast, zero-tolerance policies have been found to undermine efforts to
ii

At Seacrest, the punishment and removal of the ‘assailants’ was emphasized over a
critical analysis of the structures of the school that physically and socially segregated
black and Asian immigrant students.
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create a school environment that fosters academic engagement. At the
school level, Noguera14 found that schools with low levels of academic
engagement are more likely to employ exclusionary discipline. Similarly, in
an ethnographic study of a school in New York City, Nolan5 found that
exclusionary discipline practices and academic disengagement are
mutually reinforcing. She draws particular attention to how high stakes
testing often contributes to creating “alienating classroom experience[s]
that play a central role in the creation of a flow of students out of
classrooms and into the hallways, giving local educational policy makers
cause to argue that students were ‘out of control’ and in need of being
policed.”5(p37) Nolan demonstrates that schools under pressure to raise test
scores are more likely to punish students who do not respond to their
instructional practices.
Other research has shown that conflict resolution, peer mediation,
mentoring, increased recreational programs, positive behavioral
interventions and supports, social and emotional supports, and restorative
justice practices are all promising alternatives to harsh and exclusionary
discipline.22,31 Additionally, researchers have found that encouraging
students to voice their concerns about learning conditions at school can
yield promising ideas for change.32,33 In this paper, we have incorporated
student voices through interviews and focus groups to better understand
how students were affected by Seacrest’s responses to the incident.
Methodology
As part of a larger research team, we conducted a school climate study of
Seacrest High School in the 2010-2011 school year. Data collected were
both quantitative and qualitative. We conducted interviews, focus groups,
and observations, gathered administrative data, and administered a
student survey. Participation in interviews, focus groups, and the student
survey was voluntary. The diversity of data sources and the ability to
compare perceptual data with observational data allowed us to triangulate
findings.
Because we were conducting a case study of one school, we
sought to capture the perceptions of safety of all members of the Seacrest
community in our data collection. The on-site research team consisted of 3
people, and the research was carried out over a few weeks. The complete
data set encompassed a large and representative segment of the
Seacrest community.
In order to include as many constituents as possible, we relied
upon focus groups over interviews. Focus group and interview protocols
sought to understand participants’ typical daily experiences and their
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perceptions of safety and the learning environment at Seacrest. All staff
were asked to participate in a focus group during a common planning
period, and student focus groups were organized to capture students’
experiences in each grade level and academy. We targeted school
leaders, specifically the principal, the security director, the deans, and
academy leaders, for individual interviews because of their unique
responsibility and influence within the school. Focus groups for parents
were also organized and were conducted in participants’ native languages
(English, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Spanish). The 24 focus groups and
10 individual interviews lasted approximately 1 hour each and were held in
a location convenient for the interviewee, usually their office or a
classroom.
During the 3-week period of on-site data collection, 26 classroom
and 31 school-space (e.g., cafeteria, hallway) observations were carried
out. Classroom and school-space observations lasted approximately 1
hour each and followed a semi-structured protocol designed to capture the
nature of staff-student and student-student interactions in various settings.
In order to observe in as many classrooms as possible, we observed in
each classroom once, capturing a total of 26 instructional spaces.
Through interviews and focus groups alone, we captured 53
teachers, 6 administrators, 15 staff members (e.g., counselors, safety
agents), 4 service providers (e.g., after-school program directors), 35
students, and 9 parents.
All students were asked to complete the school climate survey
during 1 class period. The survey included previously field-tested and
newly designed research-based measures concerning safety, belonging,
academic engagement, discrimination, fairness, and future aspirations.
The student survey was translated from English into Spanish, Khmer,
Vietnamese, and Chinese to accommodate the diversity within the student
body. We received 428 student surveys from the approximately 700
students enrolled at Seacrest. Through a comparison with school
demographic data reported by the district, student survey data were
representative of the student body in terms of race and ethnicity within a
few percentage points.
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Table 1. Summary of participants
Participant Group

Number of
Formal Focus
Groups

Number of
Formal
Interviews

Total Number
of
Participants

Teachers

6

1

53

Administrators

1

1

6

Staff (e.g., counselors, deans,
police, etc.)
Providers (after-school,
supplementary, etc.)
Students

3

6

15

1

1

4

9

1

35

Student Questionnaire
Parents

428
4

0

9

The administrative and survey data were analyzed with statistical
software to explore patterns within the student body. Data were
disaggregated by several demographic factors, including race, gender,
immigration status, special education status, primary language, and
country of birth. We conducted a descriptive analysis of the data, tracking
survey responses by student demographics. With the administrative data,
we explored changes between the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school
years in terms of infractions, sanctions, and attendance.
We initially coded the qualitative data deductively, isolating
excerpts relevant to the school’s response to the 2009 incident. These
sections were then inductively coded. Two of the themes which emerged
in this process—1) the expansion of school policies and accountability
systems and 2) the negligence of other school priorities—are explored at
length in this paper. Coding was conducted with the assistance of Atlas.ti.
Data Analysis
Expansion of Policies and Accountability Systems
In response to the incident between Asian and black students in the 20092010 academic year, Seacrest’s administration focused on establishing a
range of new routines and structures. These included developing new
protocols, such as setting up a clear process to address student
complaints, and enforcing the dress code with renewed vigor. According to
one school administrator, the first 3 months of the year were wholly
dedicated to such efforts:
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In September, there was a huge focus on getting the systems in place, making sure we
had them….We had to install metal detectors, hire security guards, and put a security
plan in place. So getting those things into place took time….We had to see how things
would go for the first couple of months and make sure that the issues of last year didn’t
become an obstacle for us as we were getting started.

The first step toward preventing a similar incident from occurring,
according to school administrators, was to set up clear procedures and
policies for security and to reinforce old policies with consistency.
Following the incident, the school and district administration had
come under considerable criticism for the way in which it had responded.
As a result of this scrutiny, a new administrative team had been installed
to manage the school. As the administrative team put its security
measures in place, local media continued to closely scrutinize what was
occurring at the school, even going so far as to place a reporter on site for
an extended period during the fall. Additionally, the district was under legal
and political pressure from the US Department of Justice and the state’s
Human Relations Council to adopt formal policies and procedures that
would make it less likely for incidents of interracial violence to occur again.
Community organizations also monitored the school closely in the
aftermath of the conflict, with one group regularly issuing complaints and
criticisms to the local media about the superintendent’s handling of the
issue. For all of these reasons, the school administration was under
considerable pressure to ensure that there was concrete evidence of
change and improvement at Seacrest.
By almost any estimation, the security measures adopted by
Seacrest were costly and extensive. Fifteen sworn police officers were
assigned to the school under the leadership of a police sergeant. A
command and control room was established with state-of-the-art
surveillance cameras, which allowed security personnel to monitor
hallways and the perimeter of the school grounds. An updated metal
detector system was installed at the school’s front door, through which
every person entering the building was required to pass. Additionally,
when school ended at 3:00 PM, police officers and school administrators
were deployed to neighboring streets to ensure that students had safe
passage to public transportation. The total cost of these measures was
well over 2 million dollars, and the funds were expended despite the fact
that the district was making severe cuts in other areas of its budget.
It was impossible for the support staff, students, and teachers not to
notice the new focus on security, considering the way it affected their
routines at school. One staff member noted approvingly that the increase
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in procedures and follow-through at Seacrest had substantially changed
the atmosphere at the school:
There’s a uniform discipline policy this year….I think that that sort of streamlining…has
helped…you know, it provides some clarity….There’s a dramatic difference this year,
even in terms of uniform enforcement of rules and stuff like that….I know it isn’t fun for
the students, but it is best for the school….The school feels a lot more organized and
orderly now.

According to the staff members who were given some of the responsibility
of enforcing policies, consistent enforcement and accountability
throughout the school helped to create a work environment that many
found supportive. Several teachers and school personnel told us that the
new routines created a sense of order that had previously been lacking at
the school. Many acknowledged that students may not be happy with all of
the changes, but the perception of order lent a much-needed sense of
legitimacy to the school after it had gained a reputation for violence
following the incident. A staff member explained: “Now there is follow
through and people are more comfortable to go and talk to somebody, and
there’s a lot of people to talk to, at times, maybe too many.”
Staff members attributed the increase in control and order not only
to the expansion of rules and new accountability structures but also to the
introduction of surveillance cameras throughout the building. When asked
what she felt was the biggest change since the previous school year, a
staff member explained, “there is no yelling in the hallway, there is not a
lot of traffic in the hallway,” and then she suggested that the change was
due to “the cameras.” The installation of surveillance cameras was
frequently cited as a primary reason for increased feelings of safety at
Seacrest. One staff member explained: “I think the climate has changed
tremendously. Our hallways are quiet now. You don’t see any students
walking around, cutting in the hallways. The cameras are excellent
because there’s nowhere for the students to hide when they are cutting.”
Another staff member noted: “The hard fact is that there are so many
cameras in the school now. I think that does something. You know?
Because there aren’t groups of students hiding in the hallway and in the
stairwells.” The fact that the incident in 2009 had occurred in the hallways
may explain why the decrease in hallway roaming took on such symbolic
importance.
Parents also voiced positive opinions about the measures taken by
Seacrest in response to the incident. In a focus group, an Asian American
parent expressed gratitude for the expansion of policies and systems at
the school: “I want to say thank you to the school and the administrator

https://digitalcommons.library.tmc.edu/childrenatrisk/vol3/iss2/5

12

Garver and Noguera: For Safety’s Sake

taking care of my child education, making me less worry. I like to
acknowledge the fact that I am appreciative of the non-discrimination
policy in the school.” Interestingly, to this parent, the security measures
were in effect a non-discrimination policy at Seacrest. Other parents in this
focus group also expressed approval with the increased regulations and
security at the school. Some requested that the school be even more
stringent in its follow-through with the students, especially when it came to
attendance and tardiness: “I want the principal to be much stricter.” One
grandparent, who escorted his child to and from the front door of Seacrest
each day, felt assured of the child’s safety in school because “the police is
guarding the area.” Another parent similarly attributed the reduction in
incidents to the increased security: “I haven’t heard of any type of fights I
heard before because all the school guards are out front.”
Students’ perceptions of the school environment also seemed to
reflect positively upon the measures taken at the school. In the 2010-2011
academic year, 70% of the students surveyed reported feeling safe at
Seacrest. The student body’s assessment of particular interventions is
summarized in Figure 1 below.iii Students were asked in a free-response
format “What actions taken by the school made you feel safe this year?”
Twenty-five percent of students named the increase in security officers
and 15% the installation of additional security cameras.

iii

Students were able to list multiple ideas such that individual students may be counted
within more than one category. Figure 1 depicts the most frequent responses—
categories with more than 15 respondents.
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Figure 1. Most frequent responses to the question: “What actions
taken by the school made you feel safe this year?”
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One student expressed her approval of the cameras in a focus group: “I
think the cameras do keep us safe because they want to know what are
you doing.” Another student noted that the school felt calmer in
comparison to the previous year:
Student 1: It’s more stable. You don’t see as many students cut school or in the hallway.
Interviewer: There used to be a lot of kids in the hallway?
Student 2: [The administration is] making new rules….Yeah, it’s good….I think there’s
enough rules.

This student drew a direct connection between the new policies and his
feelings of safety. Similar to the school staff, students’ perceptions that
fewer students were wandering the hallways was commonly cited as
evidence that the level of control at Seacrest had increased.
Not only did students report feeling safer, but the administrative
data also reveal that the number of school-based incidents significantly
decreased from the 2009 to the 2010 school year. While we cannot
directly tie the new policies to this drop in the number of infractions, the
magnitude of change suggests that the procedural and formal measures
adopted played a salient role.
The administrative data presented in Table 2 demonstrate the
decrease in incidents from the 2009-2010 to the 2010-2011 school year.
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When comparing all infractions except dress code violations in the Fall of
2009 with the Fall of 2010, the number of reported infractions significantly
decreased by 37%. The number of infractions related to incidents against
persons decreased by 50%. These incidents against persons, such as
“fighting,” “assault,” and “threats,” dropped more than other categories.
Infractions that did not pose a threat to safety, such as “truancy,” also
decreased but to a lesser degree. Interestingly, infractions that have no
direct bearing on academics or feelings of safety, such as “dress code
violation,” increased significantly. From the Fall of 2009 to the Fall of 2010,
citations for uniform violations increased over 9000%. This increase was
due to renewed attention to uniform violations on the part of the
administration. Students violating the uniform policy were stopped when
entering the building in the morning and were sent to in-school suspension
where they often spent the entire day, unless the student was brought a
change of clothes and then he or she could go to class after first or
second period. Although we were told that students were given work to
complete during in-school suspension so as not to fall behind, for the time
we carried out our research at Seacrest, we never observed students
doing academic work during in-house suspension (see more about the
neglect of learning below).
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Table 2. Highest incident infraction types, comparison Fall 2009 to Fall 2010
Infraction Type

Fall 2009

Failure to follow classroom rules/
disruption

106

34

72

%
Difference
-67.9

Fighting

45

13

32

-71.1

Simple assault

33

2

31

-93.9

Threats

15

4

11

-73.3

Reckless endangerment

25

19

6

-24.0

2

194

192

25

22

3

-12.0

6

7

1

16.7

22

16

6

-27.3

13

12

1

-7.7

2

3

1

50.0

Dress code violation
Truancy/excessive tardiness/
cutting class
Possession of beepers/pagers/ cell
phones/other devices
Profane/obscene language or
gestures
Harassment/bullying/cyberbullying/intimidation
Instigation of or participation in
group assaults

Fall 2010

Difference

iv

9600.0

Additionally, our observations revealed that by using security to
enforce dress code violations, there was a substantial increase in the
number of conflicts between students and security personnel over
relatively minor incidents. Using the school police in this way affected the
students’ experiences at Seacrest and significantly contributed to an
overall climate of strained relations between staff and students at the
school. During our time at Seacrest, we observed one student handcuffed
when he refused to report to a dean for a dress code violation. We also
saw students in the hallways repeatedly reproached by school safety
agents for using cell phones or failing to remove their hats. Seacrest’s use
of a zero-tolerance approach to discipline allowed small infractions to be
treated with harsh consequences.
Overall, the expansion and tightening of security policies at the
school seemed to be effective in deterring incidents and making members
of the school community feel safer. It should be noted that these data are
self-reported and only include reported incidents. There is the possibility
that school staff may have underreported incidents after the previous
iv

The comparison between Fall 2009 and Fall 2010 reflects the first 12 weeks of the
school year, including the weeks in Fall 2010 when the research team was at the school
conducting data collection.
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year’s conflict in response to heightened public scrutiny. (Indeed, survey
responses concerning the number of unsafe situations students are
exposed to each week suggests that administrative data provided a low
estimate of actual incidents.) Yet several administrators, support-staff
members, students, parents, and teachers did identify the adoption of new
policies and procedures as a primary reason they felt safer at Seacrest.
The approach to school discipline and security taken at Seacrest is
indicative of the “broken windows” approach to discipline that has been
used to reduce crime in neighborhoods. The “broken windows” approach
was developed by James Q. Wilson34 and called for law enforcement to
respond quickly to relatively minor infractions as a strategy to deter major
criminal offenses. In interviews and focus groups with school staff and
some students, we found considerable support for this approach. At
Seacrest, much energy and attention was spent citing and punishing dress
code violations (194 within the first 3 months of the school year). The logic
behind this approach was that if students understood they could not get
away with minor offenses like dress code violations more serious
infractions would be avoided at the school.
Even though the “broken windows” strategy as applied at Seacrest
seemed to result in greater numbers of students and staff feeling safe, it is
also clear that it contributed to tensions between students and security
personnel and took away from a focus on academics and other school
functions. Not all constituents felt that the new routines were positively
effecting substantive changes at the school or getting at the causes of the
previous year’s conflicts. One student noted an increase in security but
went on to observe that “there’s still tension.” Another student estimated
that there were 1 to 2 fights in the cafeteria each week. One teacher
recounted that his classroom equipment had been stolen on multiple
occasions, and because he had no secure place to lock it, he carried all
his equipment to and from school each day in order to provide a
classroom resourced with the necessary tools to study his content area.
He dismissed the idea that the surveillance cameras were deterring
students from misbehavior and complained that the administration was not
responsive to offenses. Toward the end of 2010, one teacher worried that
she was seeing an increased number of students roaming the hallway.
She expressed concern that this might be an indicator of another incident
to come:
One of the things I worry about it that there are a lot of kids wandering the halls, and we
do have a lot of security and help like that, but there still are a lot of kids who, I don’t
know what they’re doing in the hall during every period….We don’t have enough security
people maybe to keep them in place, and as the day wears on there are more and more

Published by DigitalCommons@TMC, 2012

17

Journal of Applied Research on Children: Informing Policy for Children at Risk, Vol. 3 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 5

kids in the hallway, so I think that that’s what precipitated the problem last year was, you
know, too many kids out of class roaming in the hallway….I mean, there were lots of
problems, but you know, this issue of kids not being in the classroom, I worry about that.

Interestingly, this teacher suggests that the school may need even more
security officers to maintain order in the hallways, despite the fact that the
large number of security officers already on staff did not seem to be an
effective deterrent. Another teacher pointed to student initiative, instead of
administrative or staff efforts, as the reason why the school has become
safer after the incident. He suggested that the students were tired of the
negative attention the school was receiving in the wake of the incident and
that they came together to change the school culture. Similarly, 35% of
students reported that no actions taken by the school had made them feel
safe, and only 6% cited the strict enforcement of rules (see Figure 1
above). These results reflect the ambivalence that was evident in the
qualitative data: some school community members favored the increase of
policing and surveillance, while others saw it as ineffective or irrelevant to
their daily experience at Seacrest.
The development of new policies at Seacrest was intended to
reduce intergroup tensions and to make physical conflict less likely. The
policies were created in part to meet the demands of the consent decree
and to avoid legal culpability in the face of community groups that were
threatening to file law suits against the school district. Under these
pressures and intense scrutiny from the local media, it is understandable
why the school and district adopted a strategy that narrowly focused on
security. However, as we show in the following sections, not only did such
a focus have a limited impact on perceptions of safety, it also completely
overlooked other important aspects of school culture that are critical to
school success.
The data we collected suggest that the effectiveness of the new
policies was largely related to their symbolic power. As Edelman explains,
organizations often “elaborate their formal structures to create visible
symbols of their attention to law.”35(p1567) The structures, and the
appearance of stability they communicated to the staff, students, and
parents at Seacrest, were intended to reestablish the school’s legitimacy
after the incident. “Symbolic compliance”35 provides protection and
legitimacy, 2 important and necessary conditions but, by definition, falls
short of providing substantive change. The symbolic yet ineffective role of
the cameras was not lost upon the students. One 12th grade student
explained:
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People still do what they want to do. Those cameras are nothing but black balls on the
ceiling. All they do is give you a heads up if there’s a problem, but most likely the problem
has already escalated before you get to where it’s at. So the cameras really don’t do
nothing.

However, in the aftermath of the violent incidents, “symbolic compliance”
may be all Seacrest was capable of providing.
The overreliance on structures, routines, and systems may have
been due to a feeling of helplessness on the part of administrators who
work in an under-resourced and “high needs” school. One teacher
expressed doubt that the root of misunderstandings and conflicts between
student groups can be addressed by Seacrest: “For the school to treat
these conflicts as something that can be dealt with through discipline, or
through more surveillance, is kind of naïve.” Elaborating further, an
administrator explained that the establishment of procedures for students
to report an incident, clarifying who to go to and who is responsible for
follow-up, was an attainable move that took little effort on his end but, he
believed, was nonetheless significant. He explained: “That was the easy
part to fix.” This is a clear example of symbolic compliance to legal
requirements without substantively addressing the root of student conflict.
Accordingly, our study suggests that symbolic compliance may be more
likely in settings that are under-resourced and overworked, such as
Seacrest. Further research is needed to explore the relationship between
school demographics, resources, and symbolic compliance.
Learning Neglected
It is important to note that prior to the incident in 2009, Seacrest was
widely regarded as an academically troubled school. According to a 2009
school report card based on state exams, less than 20% of students had
tested proficient in reading, and less than 10% of students had reached
proficiency in math. In addition, almost 20% of the student body dropped
out prior to graduation, and only 46% of students were on track to
graduate within 4 years. Because of Seacrest’s dismal academic record, it
was particularly noteworthy that we consistently found the effort expended
toward creating and implementing new security and disciplinary policies
consumed so much staff energy that strategies to promote learning and a
positive school climate were neglected. Several of the administrators we
interviewed openly admitted that their attention was consumed with
deterring or quelling student incidents. As a result, they had paid little
attention to classrooms and instruction. In an interview, one administrator
explained:
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The security and discipline systems were dysfunctional. We were trying to come in and
fix those things and get those up and running. So that’s where I’ve put most of my focus
into since the beginning of the year. I know you got to focus on classrooms and making
sure students are learning, but my thing was how can I make it as quiet as possible.

In a focus group, several administrators explained their absence from the
classroom by the need to address what they describe as the “constant
triage of incidents”:
Interviewer: Have you been able to really get into classrooms much this year?
Administrator 1: Not like we should. We’ve had so much going on….You know we’ve had
meetings like this one….We’ve had meetings at—
Administrator 2: —4-hour meetings
Administrator 1: and then you know….issues that have to be dealt with so, no, we are not
getting in like we’d really like to…
...
Administrator 1: Well, one thing I want to add is that we spend a lot of time making sure
things are better, you know.
Interviewer: Right.
Administrator 1: To make sure to be proactive, take a lot of proactive measures to, so
that we don’t have anything happen after what happened last year. So that’s another
thing that takes a lot of our time.
...
Administrator 2: And also just the day-to-day triage. I mean things just come up, and
safety is always key. Many days you come in here with a list of where you want to go for
the day, but something else just jumps on top of the page. So every day.

These administrators viewed the creation of security and discipline
systems as the first priority and instruction as the second: “Now I would
like to pick up more of the instructional leadership role because those
climate pieces and the security of the facility, I don’t have to worry about
that as much. They’re up and running now.” This administrator’s comment
reflects a perspective that we heard articulated often: the goal of pursuing
security and stability is separate and distinct from the goal of improving
teaching and learning. Despite the fact that several studies have shown
that school safety and student learning are inextricably linked5 and that
academic engagement is a central part of developing a positive and safe
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school culture,26,36 the 2 efforts were treated as though they were
unrelated. Past research has shown that, if students are not engaged in
academics, incidents are more likely to occur as a result of distractions
and boredom.6 The danger created by the situation at Seacrest is that by
focusing on policies aimed at controlling behavior without improving the
rigor and quality of instruction, a recurring negative cycle can emerge: a
focus on policies leads to the negligence of academic engagement;
student disinterest in academics leads to an increase in incidents; and an
increase in incidents leads to a change or expansion of security policy. In
this way, security systems and structures continue to grow, while
academic engagement and improving the quality of education students
receive—ostensibly the primary goals of all schools—are diminished in
importance.
The de-emphasis on teaching and learning was expressed by
teachers and was observable in classrooms. Teaching was often hindered
by the burden of paperwork that accompanied the newly expanded regime
of security policies. This was on top of the constraints of the mandated
curricula that the district imposed upon the school. Many teachers told us
that the pressure put on the school to improve safety was detracting from
their ability to focus on instruction:
Teacher 1: We’re so under the microscope. We have to document so many things.
Interviewer: You don’t have as much time to teach now?
Teacher 2: No, I don’t. I have a feeling we’re becoming the jack of all trades and the
master of none. There’s so many things that get put on you, requiring your attention that
you can’t do any of them. Nothing is getting right around here.

The administrators’ neglect of instructional leadership and the
teachers’ stress from the increased mandates likely contributed to the lack
of academic engagement among students. In a focus group, one student
described the monotony of instruction in some classes: “You go to the
classroom, and you do the same thing every day, and they don’t help you.
They put the stuff on the board and say, ‘you do this.’ That’s not helping
the students to learn nothing.” Some students perceived their teachers’
focus on discipline as evidence of a lack of commitment to students. One
student advised new students at Seacrest: “You gotta learn on your
own…some teachers don’t teach you,” and another student in the focus
group added, “some teachers don’t put in a lot of effort.” When asked if
teachers help if he has a problem with course work, one student
explained, “Sometimes they…give advice, but then you go back to the
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problem and it’s the same again….When I have a problem, I just shrug it
off.” Such inattention to students’ academic needs was parallel to a careful
attention to student behavior and disciplining.
In one classroom, a teacher referred 2 students to a dean for
discipline because they were caught looking at the National Football
League (NFL) website. However, the teacher had not given the students
an assignment. One dean reported that she receives about 20 referrals a
day from teachers concerning behavioral issues. This dean estimated that
about 17 of the 20 referrals were the result of poor teaching and a lack of
classroom management skills and that only 3 were “serious” incidents that
warranted her involvement.
While the focus on discipline and safety policies may indirectly
affect instruction and learning by leaving little time and energy for the
classroom, the “culture of control”16 at Seacrest also had more direct
effects on classroom life. One teacher recounted an instance in which the
arrest of a student interfered with her teaching:
I have police come in arrest one of my students in the middle of class, in the middle of
class. They could’ve done it at the end of the period. They decided to do it in the middle
of class so the rest of the class was shot. All the kids wanted to do was talk about the
fight that that student has been in that ended him up getting arrested.

On the other hand, some security officers suggested that teachers were
too quick to call on safety officers for issues that they should be able to
deal with in the classroom: “It should be a sense of classroom
management. A lot of teachers sometimes tend to just want to call school
police every time a child decides to be disruptive in class.” The
involvement of security officers in addressing minor infractions (e.g., a
student who refuses to do work in class) was initiated by several teachers.
Once security officers are involved in responding to an incident, it is more
likely that a student will be removed from the classroom or even arrested,
since these are the primary and most practiced responses in the security
officers’ toolkit.
Students seemed to be aware of the trade-offs between security
and academics. In a focus group, one 12th grade student asked: “Y’all
paid…for those cameras and we don’t have books. We still don’t even
have all our books for statistics class, like some of the books ripped up,
we gotta share the books, like it don’t make no sense….How about you
get us books first?....I think it was a waste of money.” The prioritization of
safety and discipline policies was communicated clearly in the school
leadership’s efforts, through the large sums of money expended on
security, and by the way attention to student learning was allowed to fall to
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the wayside. Although these policies may have provided Seacrest the
ability to establish a reputation for control under considerable external
pressure and scrutiny, the goal was pursued at the expense of learning.
School Culture Neglected
To a large degree, the move toward increased surveillance and control
was rationalized as an effort to create more equitable experiences across
the student body. It was believed that such efforts would lead to a more
positive school culture. One administrator stated: “We have been strict
across the board with everybody. We’ve been very, very strict across the
board.” A staff member referred to this new emphasis as “common law”
and explained that adults were held accountable to dole out
consequences to students according to policy: “This is our school policy.
You have to do it to students.” One administrator’s comments directly
suggested that having all students experience the same consequences
was a way of creating unity among the student body—as if ‘under one
policy and punishment, we are all equal.’ He elaborated: “It doesn’t matter
whether they are this or that, when you’re walking down the hallway with a
phone, we’re going to catch you…so other children do not feel a sense of
favoritism.” The logic behind this strategy was that the Asian-black student
conflict could be addressed by submitting all students to the same strict
surveillance and discipline. Through strict enforcement of the discipline
code and security policies, it was believed that the school would become
safer and that a sense of community would develop.
Our data suggest that such a tactic contributed to a shared sense
of grievance based on negative experiences among students. We found
that the attention paid to discipline and safety policies came at the
expense of a positive school culture. One student reflected on the way the
surveillance cameras affected the school climate: “Well lately I haven’t
seen conflicts between Asians and blacks, but there’s still an unsure
feeling because some people feel like their privacy is getting invaded
because of all the cameras and the more security and all that.” This
student suggested that new problems had emerged with the interventions
put in place intended to deter interracial conflict.
Complaints about security officers’ interactions with students were
common. One student reflected: “The police officers are always being
rude to the kids….They’re always disrespectful and yelling in their ears.”
When asked whether he felt safe in school, one black male student
responded: “I’m kind of scared of police….I’m afraid like they think I’m
doing something, that I look suspicious to them. I really, I just don’t like
security. I really don’t.” Students recounted several instances of observing
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other students arrested in the school building. One student spoke about a
time the police patted down a group of boys in the gym and then
handcuffed one. During the entrance procedure in the mornings, female
and male students entered in separate lines and went through a metal
detector. According to one security officer, students are also randomly
subjected to “invasive search” in order to catch illegal drugs on the bodies
of students, even if the metal detector does not go off.
In an interview, one officer explained the new approach to security:
“It was basically setting it up to run like a police department in the school,
treating the building as a city….The hallways are the streets, the
classrooms are the communities….The main thing first was to get some
sense of order in here and accountability.” Accordingly, this officer
seemed to embrace the picture of policing described by the students, a
perspective that reinforced the idea that policing inside and outside the
school doors had become indistinguishable. One security officer explained
his negotiation of being placed in a school and upholding the law as a
police officer:
There’s a common respect there, I told them I will lock you up if it leads to that. That’s not
what I want to do, and that’s usually my last resort. I’m not in the business of giving kids
police records, but if I’m forced in a situation where I can’t, I have no leeway. I have to do
what I have to do but for my job. It’s a very fine line.

While the survey suggested that many students perceived the school to be
safe as a result of the new security measures and discipline procedures, it
also revealed that students did not feel Seacrest had a positive learning
environment. Rather, for many students, the school was perceived as an
extension or even a paradigmatic example of the “culture of control.”16
Survey data further demonstrate students’ negative assessments of
Seacrest’s environment. According to students’ ratings, Seacrest fell short
on measures of fairness, belonging, and multicultural cohesion, and it only
met minimally necessary levels of school-based supportive relationships.
The highest ratings went to school-based supportive relationships, which
was given 3.1 on a 4-point Likert scale, where 1 is very negative and 4 is
very positive. The mean of ratings for fairness was 2.8, and it was 2.6 for
belonging. Multicultural cohesion was rated significantly lower than the
other scales regardless of demographic characteristics, with a mean rating
of only 2.4.
Aside from the new security policies’ negative effects on academic
engagement and school climate, the intensive focus on the incident and
Seacrest’s response to it led to other educational concerns and
community needs being overlooked and de-prioritized. Seacrest once had
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a well-regarded culinary arts program, but during the year when security
became the school’s top priority, the program lost resources and its
director left the school. One administrator lamented that 2 students had
been murdered in the previous year but that these traumatic experiences
had been overshadowed by the efforts put toward responding to the more
publicized Asian-black incident.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the violent incidents between Asian and black students
at Seacrest High School in the 2009-2010 school year, it is
understandable that school and district administrators would have placed
great emphasis on addressing matters related to safety, order, and
security. Moreover, after signing a consent decree with the US
Department of Justice and the state Department of Human Relations,
which required the district to enact a variety of safety measures, and
under pressure and scrutiny from local media and community groups, it
makes sense that the district would have taken every step available to
ensure that there would be no recurrence of violence at the school.
A vast body of research on schooling has shown that safety is an
essential requisite for a positive educational environment. In fact,
education philosopher John Dewey37 and psychologist Abraham Maslow38
have argued that violence, disorder, and threats to physical safety are
antithetical to an environment where students can learn and develop and
where teachers can instruct effectively.
However, several studies have also shown that school safety is
largely a by-product of strong positive relationships between students and
staff29,36 and not the adoption of advanced security measures.4 In fact, as
this study of Seacrest has shown, by placing a disproportionate amount of
energy and attention on security issues, the school neglected other
important elements of its larger educational goals, namely teaching and
learning and a positive school culture.
It is important to understand that the fragmented focus on school
safety is not unique to Seacrest and the unusual circumstances that were
confronting the school. Schools as complex organizations are driven by
multiple and often competing goals. Since the advent of zero-tolerance
policies, schools across the country have adopted a number of costly
security measures and highly punitive discipline policies in an attempt to
ensure safety (or the perception of safety) at the expense of other
concerns.18 Positive perceptions of safety are not insignificant, as they are
vital to upholding the school’s moral authority to maintain order,39 as well
as to students’ and teachers’ abilities to focus on academics. However,
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the effort to create safe and orderly schools increasingly has come to
resemble the fight against crime in the larger society, and like the larger
effort, underlying issues related to poverty, inequality, and institutional bias
have largely been ignored.3,6
The fact that some students and staff at Seacrest looked favorably
upon the increase in surveillance, policing, and zero-tolerance approaches
to discipline despite their negative effects on school culture and learning
draws attention to how school policy not only materially affects students’
and staff members’ everyday lives (e.g., creating paperwork, bringing new
and harsher punishments) but also limits the range of solutions they
perceive as possible or effective in addressing problems at school and
likely beyond the school doors as well. School policies have socializing
powers and contribute to shaping the thinking of how societal problems
should and could be addressed (e.g., through supportive versus punitive
interventions). Certainly, the school’s tactics were first informed by the
larger US “culture of control,”16 but the school’s role in reinforcing and
influencing society in return must also be recognized.
As the case of Seacrest shows, narrowing the focus of school
improvement efforts to a singular goal can result in schools neglecting
important aspects of the educational mission that are essential to school
success and youth development. The alternative to a narrow focus on
safety and security is a broad focus on the environmental conditions within
schools that promote strong, positive relationships between educators and
students that are essential to learning and child development. American
education philosopher John Dewey, in writing about the conditions for
growth, explains why a broad focus on the learning environment and
school culture is essential. He writes:
Development when it is interpreted in comparative terms, that is, with respect to the
special traits of child and adult life, means the direction of power into special channels:
the formation of habits involving executive skill, definiteness of interest, and specific
objects of observation and thought….The adult must use his powers to transform the
environment thereby occasioning new stimuli which redirect student powers and keep
37(p40)
them developing. Ignoring this fact leads to arrested development…

In narrowly pursuing safety or higher test scores in isolation from
other goals that Dewey describes as essential to child development,
schools like Seacrest invariably remain mired in failure. Cases like this
one are reminders that safety cannot be disassociated from the broader
mission of schools, and to the degree that they are, genuine and
sustainable school improvement will continue to be out of reach.
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